Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts

August 3, 2016

Slate and the Solitary Ethnographic Diagram

While his style and message does not resonate with me at all, I've always thought that Donald Trump's speeches were highly-structured rhetoric. He seems to be using a form of intersubjective signaling [1] understood by a number of constituencies as communicating their values in an authentic manner. Specifically, the speeches have a sentence structure and cadence that can be differentiated from the literalism of contemporary mainstream society or more traditional forms of doublespeak ubiquitous in American politics.

This is why the most recent challenge from Slate Magazine was too good to pass up. The challenge (which has the feel of a Will Shortz challenge): diagram a passage from a Donald Trump speech given on July 21 in Sun City, South Carolina. The passage is as follows:
"Look, having nuclear—my uncle was a great professor and scientist and engineer, Dr. John Trump at MIT; good genes, very good genes, OK, very smart, the Wharton School of Finance, very good, very smart—you know, if you’re a conservative Republican, if I were a liberal, if, like, OK, if I ran as a liberal Democrat, they would say I’m one of the smartest people anywhere in the world—it’s true!—but when you’re a conservative Republican they try—oh, do they do a number—that’s why I always start off: Went to Wharton, was a good student, went there, went there, did this, built a fortune—you know I have to give my like credentials all the time, because we’re a little disadvantaged—but you look at the nuclear deal, the thing that really bothers me—it would have been so easy, and it’s not as important as these lives are (nuclear is powerful; my uncle explained that to me many, many years ago, the power and that was 35 years ago; he would explain the power of what’s going to happen and he was right—who would have thought?), but when you look at what’s going on with the four prisoners—now it used to be three, now it’s four—but when it was three and even now, I would have said it’s all in the messenger; fellas, and it is fellas because, you know, they don’t, they haven’t figured that the women are smarter right now than the men, so, you know, it’s gonna take them about another 150 years—but the Persians are great negotiators, the Iranians are great negotiators, so, and they, they just killed, they just killed us"
Okay, here you go -- an ethnographic-style diagram [2] based on one man, but perhaps instructive of an entire American subculture (click to enlarge). The diagram focuses on the relationship between John and Donald Trump (context-specific braintrust) and a specific worldview of power wielded through nuclear weapons, financial ability, and persuasion.


NOTES:
[1] In this case, intersubjective signaling could be used as a mechanism to reinforce group cohesion, particularly when the group's belief structure is defined by epistemic closure.

[2] Perceived lack of agency shown as red arcs terminated with a dot.

August 1, 2016

Reaction to the Future, part infinity

Alvin Toffler, futurist and author of Future Shock and The Third Wave, died recently at the age of 87. Future Shock and The Third Wave [1] were favorite books of mine when I was in High School, and contains a lot of unexplored themes. The book's main argument was that rapid technological change is accompanied by a number of negative social effects, including reactionary political movements and collective psychocultural responses. As the rate and scope of technological change has increased [2], this shock to human society has become more acute [3]. The Thrid Wave was more directly related to cultural change, and assumed that major observed  transitions in cultural evolution [4] required profound shifts in sociology, economics, and psychology.


We can see this effect in our own society, particularly with respect to the economy of mind. As a cultural trend, more young people are pursuing a life of creative and/or mental productivity [5]. While some of this productivity is tangible (see the contemporary focus on applications of University research),  In particular, there is a strain of austerity thinking [6] that has arisen since 2008 which views intellectual expertise more generally and academic activity more specifically as a superfluous fraud. Since many of these pursuits require public (government) funding and/or provide no immediate tangible return, there is ideological bias at play as well. More generally, future shock can manifest itself as a revolt against modernity.


The blogger Drugmonkey, advancing the Mellon Doctrine (among other types of reactionary thinking) in the realm of biomedical science. 


Don't be a neo-reactionary! Hint: you don't need to appeal to religion to take this point of view.

The legacy of Toffler's ideas have gotten a bit muddled [7], and in exposed one of the problems with futurism: namely, it is hard to discern solid predictions from quasi-religious pronouncements. The unfortunate event of Toffler's death also coincides with the 50th Anniversary of the first episode of Star Trek (circa 1966). Star Trek's prime directive is an interesting detail of the Starfleet Academy rulebook consistent with Toffler's argument. The prime directive is more directly related to cultural evolution, and states that Starfleet cannot interfere in the normal trajectory of a given culture's development [8]. It is not clear how this works in practice, however, since mere cultural contact can change the trajectory of cultural evolution more than simple exposure to various foreign technologies [9]. On the other hand, if they are adopted, the introduction of single tools or cultural practices can have profound effects on a culture's trajectory.

This concept will take a long time to become culturally consistent. How long? Probably much longer than predicted by Gene Roddenbery (creator of Star Trek).

Some people who might argue that Toffler and Roddenbery are simply products of their era (the 20th century, a period of rapid technological change). Their views on the outcomes of change (technological advancement and modern cultural mores) are biased towards a historical positivism. In other words, progressive technological change is inevitable, even if we mediate this path to eventual enlightenment. Yet this view ignores the basic outlines of historical complexity -- that cultural and technological complexity does tend to increase, even if the process is painful, chaotic, and uneven [10].


NOTES:
[1] Toffler, A.   Future Shock. Random House, 1970 AND Toffler, A.   The Third Wave. Bantam Books, 1980.

[2] this is not necessarily equivalent to the rate of innovation, but rather has to do with the dynamics of technology adoption. For those of you who are familiar with early period (pre-2005) Wired magazine, ideological constructions around the term "neo-Luddite" characterizes the cultural aspect of this effect. For more, please see: Katz, J.   Return of the Luddites. Wired, June 1, 1995.

[3] this can be observational (such as noticing the preponderance of payphones in an several-decades old movie) or more profound (such as automation-related job losses).

[4] the major transitions of cultural evolution may or may not result from directional trends in cultural complexity.

[5] AKA The "yuccie" manifesto. For more, please see: Infante, D.   The hipster is dead, and you might not like who comes next. Mashable, June 09, 2015.

[6] Austerity thinking is associated with an obsession with debt which is underlain by a number of cultural and epistemic biases. There are a number of cultural antecedents that stress the connections between debt and morality, while most if not all cultural traditions are ill-equipped to deal with the logic and technical details of modern economics and finance. This latter point (an incompatibility between cultural traditions and advanced technology) was addressed in the book "Technopoly" by Neil Postman. A similar conceptual gap is also seen amongst popular responses to technologies such as genetic modification, which comes into conflict with many traditional cultural themes involving cleanliness and purity.

[7] There is a fascinating political subtext to how Toffler's ideas played out in society, namely his association with Newt Gingrich and anti-neo-luddite politics in the 1990s. Not particularly in line with Toffler's own views, but definitely a study in historical context. For more, please see: Murphy, T. Newt's New-Age Love Gurus. Mother Jones, January 30, 2012.

[8] For one interesting dissent on the optimality of the prime directive, please see: Clint, E.   The Prime Directive: Star Trek’s doctrine of moral laziness. Skeptic Ink blog, November 4, 2012.

[9] This statement is consistent with a process called "trans-cultural diffusion". For more, please see. Albrecht, K.   Trans-cultural diffusion. September 13, 2013.

[10] The essential lesson from the emerging field of cliodynamics. For more, please see: Turchin, P.   Arise 'cliodynamics'. Nature, 454, 34-35 (2008).

January 26, 2015

Science and Politics or Science versus Politics?

A few items on the intersection of politics and science (and the tension between the two). First up is an infographic that shows the relative frequency of various "science and engineering words" during the annual State of the Union (SOTU) address by all US Presidents since Teddy Roosevelt. The "science and tech" category is at the bottom, and has been an increasingly important component of these speeches over the last 40 years.


Related to societal relevance is the whole issue of political will and action on science-related topics. This is particularly true when it comes to policies that address Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW). This point was not missed during the 2015 SOTU. However, one might wonder how effectively climate policy can be when most politicians have a cursory (at best) technical understanding of scientific issues. Perhaps advocacy for science policy (e.g. lobbying) is not enough after all -- perhaps we need more scientist-politicians.

COURTESY: 350.org

Many discussions of global warming (mostly involving denialists) involve an appeal to the scientific consensus. While the consensus does point strongly towards the reality of a human-induced warming of the planet, the discoveries that lead to this consensus were individualistic quests for data. The data were not voted into existance, and neither can consensus on a scientific issue [1]. While skepticism should come into play when considering the implications of findings, it should not play a role in judging conclusions drawn from isolated findings. For one example, please see this article by Ethan Siegel on Starts With a Bang! blog on why science by democracy (or popular consensus) does not represent how science is actually done.

A call for scientist-politicians? COURTESY: Grady Carter blog (for the montage).

The final item in this post in a new Kickstarter/film initiative to bring awareness to the American space program. "Fight for Space" is a project to bring awareness of budgetary cuts to our scientific endeavors and the pressure to fulfill politically-approved missions. To change this state of affairs, check out the Planetary Society's advocacy efforts. The scientific mission of NASA has been yielding significant returns as of late [2], so help to keep this momentum going.

COURTESY: SaganSense Tumblr.

NOTES:
[1] The popularity of a set of ideas do not mean that they are scientifically credible. For more, see this article from Why Evolution is True regarding the lack of evidence for but popular persistence of proposals involving a divine origin of life.



August 31, 2014

Godel's Revenge: All-Encompassing Formalisms vs. Incomplete Formalisms

This content is cross-posted to Tumbld Thoughts. A loosely-formed story in two parts about the pros and cons of predicting the outcome of and otherwise controlling complex sociocultural systems. Kurt Godel is sitting in the afterlife cafe right now, scoffing but also watching with great interest.



I. It's an All-encompassing, Self-regulation, Charlie Brown!


Here is a video [1] by the complexity theorist Dirk Helbing about the possibility of a self-regulating society. Essentially, by combining big data with the principles of complexity would allow us to solve previously intractable problems [2]. This includes more effective management of everything from massively parallel collective behaviors to very-rare events.


But controlling how big data is used can keep us from getting into trouble as well. Writing at Gigaom blog, Derrick Harris argues that the potentially catastrophic effects of AI taking over society (the downside of the singularity) can be avoided by keeping key data away from such systems [3]. In this case, even hyper-complex AI systems based on deep learning can become positively self-regulating.

NOTES:

[2] For a cursory review of algorithmic regulation, please see: Morozov, E.   The rise of data and the death of politics. The Guardian, July 19 (2014).

For a discussion as to why governmental regulation is a wicked problem and how algorithmic approaches might be inherently unworkable, please see: McCormick, T.   A brief exchange with Tim O’Reilly about “algorithmic regulation”. Tim McCormick blog, February 15 (2014).

[3] Harris, D.   When data become dangerous: why Elon Musk is right and wrong about AI. Gigaom blog, August 4 (2014).


II. Arguing Past Each Other Using Mathematical Formalisms


Here are a few papers on argumentation, game theory, and culture. My notes are below each set of citations. A good reading list (short but dense) nonetheless.

Brandenburger, A. and Keisler, H.J.   An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games. Studia Logica, 84(2), 211-240 (2006).

* shows that any two-player game is embedded in a system of reflexive, meta-cognitive beliefs. Players not only model payoffs that maximize their utility, but also model the beliefs of the other player. The resulting "belief model" cannot be completely self-consistent: beliefs about beliefs have holes which serve as sources of logical incompleteness.

What is Russell's Paradox? Scientific American, August 17 (1998).

* introduction to a logical paradox which can be resolved by distinguishing between sets and sets that describe sets using a hierarchical classification method. This paradox is the basis for the Brandenburger and Keisler paper.

Mercier, H. and Sperber, D.   Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 57-111 (2011).


Oaksford, M.   Normativity, interpretation, and Bayesian models. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 332 (2014).

* a new-ish take on culture and cognition called argumentation theory. Rather than reasoning to maximize individual utility, reasoning is done to maximize argumentative context. This includes decision-making that optimizes ideonational consistency. This theory predicts phenomena such as epistemic closure, and might be thought of as a postmodern version of rational agent theory. 

There also seems to be an underlying connection between the "holes" is a culturally-specific argument and the phenomenon of conceptual blending, but that is a topic for a future post.

January 17, 2014

Fireside Science: Bitcoin Angst with an Annotated Blogroll

This content is being cross-posted to Fireside Science.


This post is about the crypto-currency Bitcoin. If you are interested in the technical aspects of Bitcoin (WARNING: highly technical Computer Science and Mathematics content), read the following reference paper or check out the Bitcoin category on Self-evident blog . Otherwise, please read on. Citations:

Nakamoto, Satoshi   Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. Internet Archive, ark:/13960/t71v6vc06.  (2009).

Friedkl, S.   An Illustrated Guide to Cryptographic Hashes. Steve Friedl's Unixwiz.net Tech Tips. (2005).

Khan Academy: Bitcoin tutorial videos.


Being a techno-optimist (or realist, depending on which metric you use), I can't help but be fascinated by the Bitcoin phenomena. I have an interest in Economics and alternative social systems, so the promise of Bitcoin is all the more attractive. Orthogonal Research is looking into the utility of the Bitcoin model (particularly the cryptographic hash function and wagering capabilities) for understanding the evolution and emergence of economic value. 

I am generally skeptical of trends and propaganda. Therefore, once I learned that there are a finite number of Bitcoins in the world, I became unconvinced that Bitcoin could ever replace governmental currencies in the long-term. This inflexibility (which may have its roots in representative money and goldbug psychology) is one potential cause for periods of Bitcoin deflation (e.g. the value has gone up relative to real-world goods and services). This deflation has increased the hype of mining opportunities, as mining activity for high-valued Bitcoins resembles a gold rush. Conversely, Bitcoin is also vulnerable to bouts of severe inflation, which has occurred quite recently due to its use in major criminal rings and the downside of the Gartner hype cycle.

Trouble brewing on Mt. Gox! This is only temporary, though.

A lot of the Bitcoin hype is confusing to say the least. And it is not clear to me if Bitcoin mining is a totally above-board activity (this will be addressed in the articles at the end of this post). Nevertheless, Bitcoin is a significant step beyond virtual currencies such as Linden Dollars. This has been demonstrated by its interchange with conventional money and the trust a critical mass of people have placed in the currency. In addition, its cryptographic features may make Bitcoin (or something similar) a prime candidate as the currency of choice for secure internet transactions.

Below is an annotated bibilography of articles and blog posts on the phenomenon known as Bitcoin mining/trading and its libertarian underpinnings. In this discussion, I have noticed a pattern similar to the public discussion surrounding MOOCs. Much like MOOCs, technology people dominated the first few years of development, and the discussion was almost universally positive. After the initial hype, more critical voices emerged, usually from more traditional fields related to the technology. With MOOCs, these are University professors and instructors, but with Bitcoin the criticism is from financial and economics types.

COURTESY: Hardy, Q.   Bitcoin and the Fictions of Money. NY Times, January 27 (2014).

Annotated Bibliography of Bitcoin: A diversity of viewpoints from academics and journalists, mostly critical. If you want a more blue sky view of Bitcoin, there are plenty of those on the web as well. Hope you find this educational.

1) Kaminska, I.   Wikicoin. Dizzynomics, December 7 (2013).
Proposes a Bitcoin-like system for adding value to Wikipedia, without relying on the rules of Wikipedia. No competition for CPUs, reward people for valuable contributions (rather than content by the word), and new coins create new resources.

2) Stross, C.   Why I want Bitcoin to die in a fire. Charlie's Diary, December 18 (2013).
Bitcoin economy has a number of major flaws, including: high Gini coefficient (measure of economic inequality), prevalence of fraudulent behavior due to scarcity, use as a proxy for black market exchanges, mining is computationally expensive and encourages spyware and theft schemes.

3) 13) McMillan, R.   Bitcoin stares down impending apocalypse (again). January 10 (2014).
An article that discusses the distribution of Bitcoins (and hence inequality) among candidate miners. Read as a counterpoint to article (2).

4) Mihm, S.   Bitcoin Is a High-Tech Dinosaur Soon to Be Extinct. Bloomberg News, December 31 (2013).
A historical survey of private and fiat currencies, and how they work against central currencies. According to this view, Bitcoin represents the dustbin of history rather than the future of currency.

5) Krugman, P.   Bitcoin is evil. The Conscience of a Liberal blog, December 28 (2013).
A skeptical take on the viability of Bitcoin, and a primer on how Bitcoin is similar to a faux gold standard. Is Bitcoin a reliable store of value? Unlikely, given its recent performance and reputation.

6) Roche, C.   The Biggest Myths in Economics. Pragmatic Capitalism, January 8 (2014).
A refresher/primer on the theories (and mythical ideas) behind monetary policy and currency circulation. No explicit mention of Bitcoin but still relevant. Read along with article (5).

7) McMillan, R. and Metz, C.   Bitcoin Survival Guide: Everything You Need to Know About the Future of Money. Wired Enterprise, November 25 (2013).
Comprehensive overview of the Bitcoin enterprise, but nary a skeptical word. Describes the intentionally-designed upper limit on the number of Bitcoin that can circulate, as well as the cryptographic hash which enables transactions and discourages counterfeiting.

8) Yglesias, M.   Why I Haven't Changed My Mind About Bitcoin. Moneybox, December 2 (2013).
Begins with an exchange of tweets regarding the counterfeiting protections afforded by Bitcoin. Additional discussion about how the currency can be used to evade national currency regulations.

9) Coppola, F.   Bubbles, Banks, and Bitcoin. Forbes, December 30 (2013).
Explores the notion of the "entanglement" of crypto- (e.g. Bitcoin) and state (e.g. Dollars, Euros, Yuan) currencies. If a private currency system is bailed out by public ones, we will end up with a situation like the Lehman Brothers bailout. Furthermore, the uncertainty of Bitcoin as a store of value will undermine the trustworthiness of the currency, which leads to other troubles.

10) Kaminska, I.   The economic book of life. Decmeber 31 (2013).
A blog post which follows up on the Forbes article by Coppola. Is Bitcoin a harbinger of the eventual "definancialization" of money? In the digital world, thousands of digital currencies might exist side-by-side. The connections between the futurist/extropian notion of "Abundance" and crypto-currencies are also explored.


11) Salmon, F.   The Bitcoin Bubble and the Future of Currency. Medium, November 27 (2013).
A historical and speculative take on the current Bitcoin bubble and the future of money. Is Bitcoin the future? Probably not, but may very well point the way ahead.

Hype vs. valuation: a Month-long comparison.

12) Authers, J.   Time to take the Bitcoin bubble seriously. FT.com, December 11 (2013).
Argues that Bitcoin is now a serious contender as a crypto-currency due to attention paid by Wall Street and major investment firms.

13) Liu, A.   Is it time to take Bitcoin Seriously? Vice Motherboard (2013).
A review of Bitcoin's place in the contemporary social and financial landscape. Is it time to take Bitcoin seriously? Many people already are. Make points that are complementary to the discussion in (12).

14) Gans, J.   Time for a Little Bitcoin Discussion. Economist's View, December 25 (2013).
A re-evaluation of one Economist's view of Bitcoin. Very thoughtful and informative.

November 4, 2013

From Cycles to Giant Components, a Socially-guided Tour

Here are a few thematic features cross-posted to Tumbld Thoughts. You will discover the theme as you read -- it will "emerge", shall we say. But I'm not promising deep causality. 

I. Cycles of Social Events With Little Causality?


Here are some random readings on cliodynamics and why my blogging endeavors exhibit little causality. The first set of articles [1, 2] focuses on blog mining, particularly when blog posts on a given topic yields subtle causality. In [2], the Rapport Corpus was used to compile thousands of (qualitative) accounts of the same event. These data were then statistically mined to find causal mechanisms among the convergent threads. This is (in theory) similar to the mining of lung cancer data for potential (and oftentimes false-positive) causal patterns.


Another way to establish historical causality among what are often highly-qualitative and contextually-contingent accounts of observed events is to use cliodynamics [3]. Cliodynamics uses a chartist approach, which is similar to Forex trading strategies [4]. This might be useful for finding cycles of violence in historical data. However, Jason Collins [5] offers a critical analysis of Turchin's approach. Notably, Turchin [4] boils most of history down to two uniform cycles: secular (in which societies cycle from egalitarian to elitist to egalitarian in 200-300 years) and father-and-son (where social injustices are found and addressed in 60-80 year cycles). However, this does not account for large-scales changes (so-called Black Swan events) nor other complex historical contingencies.


II. Or is there more causality than suspected?


Here are two perspectives on the Nobel Syndrome: does winning a Nobel cause brilliant minds to start investigating weird things, or does it happen all on its own? In the first feature by Bradley Voytek at Oscillatory Thoughts [6], we are introduced to the prodigy effect, where young investigators win Nobels (or similar such prizes), and then go on to investigate pseudo-scientific phenomenon later in their career [7].


But does the proverbial cart (Nobel) always come before the horse (oddball research topics)? That's where the second article (by Barry Ritholz at The Big Picture blog) comes into play: is Eugene Fama (this year's winner of the Economics Nobel) an example of someone who engaged in oddball behavior before winning the prize [8]? Ritholz thinks so, and explains why that may be a pre-emptive case of Nobel syndrome.

III. Or perhaps hierarchical network effects?


Here are a few blog posts/articles on human organization, cities, and economic payoff. The first is an intellectual excursion from Dizzynomics blog [9] on the phenomenon of buying housing as investment income in central London. This has lead to massive increases in housing prices which has displaced former residents to less desirable areas. The consequence of this strategy might be to create a ghost city (a city with no permanent residents) or, worse yet when the bubble bursts, a dead city. But what happens when a few cities (such as central London) serve as critical access points for the global economy? This trend, replicated across other cities in the global urban network, may provide a subtle causal mechanism for significant income inequality. This outsized effect (in terms of scope) of a real estate arms race on overall economic opportunity is discussed in a post [10] from Moneybox blog.


But why is it, in the age of easy global travel and internet connectivity, that opportunity found in the critical access point cities has not decentralized to a large number of urban centers? The answer to this is partly due to the inherent relationship between a given city's creative performance and its population size. This has been articulated by Geoffrey West and others [11]. According to this idea, the largest cities should be the most economically (and creatively) productive. This scaling relationship can occasionally be violated, but such exceptions are directly dependent on the evolution of the city in question. 


But perhaps the nature of extreme concentration (or strict hierarchical organization) of places that are true engines of economic wealth creation have as much to do with the network topology that connects players in the global economy than the inherent properties of those players. In an network analysis of Twitter messages involving two grass-roots political organizations (the Tea Party and the Occupy), different network topologies might lead to different outcomes and sets of constraints on its function [12]. Perhaps the selective nature of a hyper-efficient, free-market global economy naturally leads to hyper-centralization and limited economic flexibility.


IV. Yes, Probably, with a Chance of Giant Components



It's hard to influence the "Giant Component". To make this point, here is an interesting book review: Robin Hanson of Overcoming Bias reviewing David Graeber's book "Debt: the first 5000 years" [13]. It is interesting not because of any particular insight or its length, but because here we have dyed-in-the-wool market capitalist reads book by a self-avowed left-wing Anarchist. And surprising because, overall, Hansen actually liked the book. I have also read "Debt", and understand Hansen's skepticism. However, there are two tacit assumptions to this dynamic that need to be understood:

1) Graeber is in an interesting position because while he is an Economic Anthropologist, he is also an activist. Therefore, the scholarship and plans for action don't always match up (as they should not). But then again, why does theory (or in this case, comparative historiography) need to be a catalyst for social change? Just because a particular theory fails to do so does not diminish what theories are actually for (e.g. explaining and predicting) [14]. And whether a particular set of theoretical assumptions actually does this is not a matter of a lack of activism.

2) The implicit goal of economics is to understand how resources are efficiently allocated. In fact, the definition of the suffix "-nomics" (or even "-omics") means "natural law", but is often used as a stand-in for quantification and optimization [15]. In fact, a goal of economics is to understand human exchange through the lens of optimal outcomes (whether or not they actually are optimal). By contrast, alternative approaches such as Economic Anthropology do not make this assumption. Such alternative approaches There is a "economics as natural law" vs. "economics as human agency" [16] dichotomy surfacing here that subtly influences much of the debate on post-crisis economics.


Now, one of Hanson's criticisms is that Graeber is inherently "anti-debt". And while Hanson does not explain why debt is a good thing (other than totally ignoring the phenomenon of predatory debt), Graeber does discuss how debt is part of a system of social and moral obligations. In this sense, debt enables a social order. However, these social orders can be unstable (due to natural disasters or wars), and it has been quite common throughout history to discharge debts. This is where Hanson has the most trouble with Graeber's position: what would happen to the world economy if debts were simply discharged? Would this not be cataclysmic? And who pays the price when debt holders are not just elites, but pension funds and endowments as well?

But this brings up a larger question: how does large-scale cultural change happen during the flow of life, and how does it happen without social collapse or (more immediately) a fundamental disruption to social life? We can view this in the context of social networks -- more importantly in terms of Renyi's Giant Component [17]. Social networks (in this case, the global economy) exhibit connectivity as a function of human exchange. In the case of modern economic social networks, a common system of finance permeates every part of the topology. This is why the financial crisis of 2008 had such an "giant" effect: the freezing of credit systems essentially had the effect of neutralizing connections throughout the network.  

Setting everything back to zero can be quite destructive. Or creatively destructive.....

The giant component, or at least one interpretation, results from a phase transition in the network structure that results in a large, unified topological component. This giant component, once it emerges, is stable. But it may also be unevolvable (e.g. serves as a cultural constraint) and perhaps even makes the entire network brittle with respect to large-scale changes [18]. It is because of this giant component that large-scale social change provides as much a risk as an opportunity: simply suspending or changing a policy or arrangement that has lead to a giant component (or of similar scale) has the potential to completely dissolve the network.



NOTES:

[1] Blog mining. Economist, March 11 (2010).

[2] Tomai, E., Thapa, L., Gordon, A.S., and Kang, S-H.   Causality in Hundreds of Narratives of the Same Events. Proceedings of the AAAI (2011).

[3] Turchin, P.   Arise 'cliodynamics'. Nature, 454, 34-35 (2008).

[4] For some perspectives on Turchin's work, please see:

a) Pigliucci, M.   Cliodynamics, a science of history? Rationally Speaking blog, August 4 (2008).

b) Finley, K.   Mathematicians Predict the Future With Data From the Past. Wired Enterprise, April 10 (2013).

[5] Collins, J.   Cliodynamics and complexity. Evolving Economics blog, August 6 (2012).

[6] Voytek, B.   The Prodigy Effect. Oscillatory Thoughts, June 8 (2013).

[7] Orac   Luc Montagnier: the Nobel disease strikes again. Respectful Insolance blog, November 23 (2010). Also, here is a Quora conversation in the topic. 

[8] Ritholz, B.   Fama has Shiller to thank for his Nobel Prize. Big Picture blog, October 20 (2013). 

[9] Kaminska, I.   Property bubbles and ghost cities. Dizzynomics, October 9 (2013) AND Goldfarb, M. London's Great Exodus. October 12 (2013). 

[10] Yglesias, M.   America's fast-growing cities aren't prospering. Moneybox blog, September 30 (2013).

[11] Robinson, R.   Can cities break Geoffrey West’s laws of urban scaling? The Urban Technologist blog, July 23 (2013).

Bettencourt, L.M., Lobo, J., Strumsky, D., and West, G.B.   Urban scaling and its deviations: revealing the structure of wealth, innovation and crime across cities. PLoS One, 5(11), e13541 (2010).

[12] Whitty, J.   Tweet Forensics: occupy vs. tea party. Mother Jones, November 17 (2011).

[13] Hanson, R.   Graeber's Debt book. Overcoming Bias blog, October 6 (2013).

[14] Johnson, T.   How economics suffers from de-politicised mathematics. Magic, Maths, and Money blog, September 21 (2013).

[15] One man's quest to make "omics" all about his life (and biology): Dennis, C.   The rise of the narciss-ome. Nature News, March 16 (2012).

[16] The performativity hypothesis, summarized in the aptly-named book: MacKensie, D.   An engine, not a camera: how financial models shape markets. MIT Press (2008).

[17] Erdos-Renyi model: Erdos, P. and Renyi, A.  On the evolution of random graphs. Publications of the Mathematical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 5, 17–61 (1960).


Hayes, B.   The birth of the giant component. bit-player blog, November 20 (2009).

[18] Jones, J.H.   Nearly Neutral Networks and Holey Adaptive Landscapes. Monkey's Uncle blog, December 29 (2008).

October 22, 2013

Fireside Science: The Consensus-Novelty Dampening

This content is being cross-posted to Fireside Science. NOTE: this content has not been peer-reviewed!


I am going to start this post with a rhetorical question: why do people often assume that traditional (or common sense) practices are inherently better, even when the cumulative evidence is inconclusive? In discussing political and economic policy-making, Duncan Black and Paul Krugman uses the term "very serious people" (VSPs) [1] to describe important people who back positions that sound serious but are actually wrong-headed and perhaps even dangerous. Part of this "seriousness" stems from appealing to their own authority or broad issues that have always been a legitimate concern.

Recently, such a "very important person" (not a famous scientist, but a VSP in spirit -- and you will see why as we move along) has published an article in Science called "Who’s Afraid of Peer Review?" [2]. This paper involved a experiment to validate quality control in peer-review in open-access journals, and had some useful results that did not particularly surprise me. For example, open-access journals that send out copious amounts of spam encouraging submission of your work may not be reject papers with faked data in them.

To recap the experiment, the author generated a large number of scientific papers with scientific-sounding (but false) results with accompanying bad graphs. The generative model used here is similar in concept to the Dada Engine [3], and the experimental treatment could best be described as 1,000 (or more) Sokal hoaxes. The papers were sent out to the many open-access journals that have popped into existence in the past 15 years, with a fair number of acceptances. There were also many rejections, most notable rejection from PLoS One, perhaps the flagship open-access journal [4].

These data speak for themselves, or do they? HINT: beware of obvious answers offering gifts..... 

There are a number of problems with this article, least of which that it does not distinguish between predatory open-access journals and more reputable ones [5]. But perhaps the real problem with Bohannon's article is that it does not explore: 1) the role of lax editorial standards at traditional peer-review journals, or 2) conceive of this as a problem of false positives rather than a moral failing. This is along the lines of Michael Eisen's (founder of PLoS One) chief criticism with the article [6], and the reason why publication in Science makes it seem a bit like subterfuge.

Eisen's other criticism involves the Science article being biased against open-access. I read the article this way as well -- the moral imperative is quite thinly-veiled. The paper takes the tone of a reactionary pundit who thinks a return to traditional norms (perhaps even imagined ones) can solve any social problem. In light of this, here is some vitriol from Michael Eisen on the problem with subscription publishers vis-a-vis this issue:
"And the real problem isn’t that some fly-by-night publishers hoping to make a quick buck aren’t even doing peer review (although that is a problem). While some fringe OA publishers are playing a short con, subscription publishers are seasoned grifters playing a long con. They fleece the research community of billions of dollars every year by convincing them of  something manifestly false – that their journals and their “peer review” process are an essential part of science, and that we need them to filter out the good science – and the good scientists – from the bad. Like all good grifters playing the long con, they get us to believe they are doing something good for us – something we need. While they pocket our billions, with elegant sleight of hand, then get us to ignore the fact that crappy papers routinely get into high-profile journals simply because they deal with sexy topics"

Which one of these is not like the other two? HINT: the guy (on the left) who violated Copyright law. HYPOTHESIS: Open-access is not a crime. COURTESY: Time Magazine cover.

From a phase space (e.g. parametric) perspective, the problem may be that traditional peer review is a sparse sampling of quality control. Of all the possible gatekeepers, we have 3-4 people either chosen at random or chosen explicitly to prime the pump (NOTE: when you suggest reviewers, you prime the pump). Not exactly the kind of strict consensus defenders of the traditional gatekeeper model like to believe exists.

A related observation (also inspired by physics) is something I call the "bifurcating opinion" issue. This occurs more often than one would think (or hope for). For example, one reviewer thinks an article is great, while the other reviewer hates it. The solution might be to add reviewers, but this might simply extend the problem in a manner similar to flipping a coin. Is this a legitimate way to reach consensus on quality control? Or is consensus even necessary?

I will now tell a story about a manuscript I posted [7] to Nature Precedings, a preprint (now archival) service run by a traditional publisher, in 2009. The paper was accepted under limited standards of quality control (there is a screening process, but no formal peer review process). I did so for two reasons: 1) a belief in scientific transparency, and 2) it did not fit cleanly into any existing journal (based on my first-pass approximation of the journal landscape). Soon after posting the paper, I was contacted by a Journal editor, who encouraged me to submit the paper to their Journal (which I did).

Three months later, the editor contacted me and said that 45 reviewers felt they could not be impartial reviewers to the article. So at least my intuitions were vindicated! But what does this say about quality control? Most certainly, the reviewers were not willing to issue a false positive acceptance. But does this come at the expense of rejecting novelty (a false negative)?

A schematic showing a 3-D phase space (demonstrating examples of sparse sampling and bifurcating opinion) of scientific expertise for a given area of research/article. The phenomenon of bifurcating opinion was used to show that agreement amongst reviewers is expected at no better than a chance occurance by [8].

In an article from the Chronicle of Higher Education [9], it is pointed out that open-access journals are in a frontier (e.g. wild-west) phase of development. In that sense, a non-uniform degree of quality control should be expected across a random sampling of journals -- with some degree of predatory enterprise. A representative from Science said this about the results of [2]:
“We don’t know whether peer review is as bad at traditional journals,” he said. “Then again, OA is the growth area in scientific publishing.”
This brings up another issue: does selectivity necessarily reflect quality? In the Bohannon study [2], open-access accepted the fraudulent papers even after they were put through peer-review process. As far as I am aware, the qualitative responses of these reviewers were not considered as a factor in the acceptance of fraudulent articles.

Journals with high selectivity are widely assumed to be better at filtering out noise (e.g. weak results and methods) and potential fraud. However, as long as the rejection rate (100-acceptance rate) exceeds the number of fraudulent manuscripts, selectivity and fraud (or error) detection tend to be two seperate things. Sure, journals with a low acceptance rate are likely to include fewer fraudulent papers. But these same journals will also tend to reject many reasonable, and sometimes even outstanding papers.

It is notable that retractions of papers from highly-selective journals are not that rare. Take the case of Anil Potti, whose data were discovered to be fabricated. The result (as of 2012) is 11 retractions, 7 corrections, and 1 patrtial retraction [10]. Only 2 of these retractions involved an open-access journal (PLoS One). The rest, in fact, involved peer reviewed biomedical journals.

A classification scheme for Type I (B -- or a false negative) and II (C -- or a false positive) error in manuscript evaluation. The goal of peer review should be to minimize the number of manuscripts in categories B and C. Of course, this is not considering manuscripts rejected for non-fraudulent reasons.

What are potential solutions to some of these problems [11]? Particularly, how can we keep selectivity from stifling innovation (e.g. novel interpretations, groundbreaking findings)? Can the concept of crowdsourcing provide any inspiration for this? John Hawks [12] discusses radically-open peer review as done by F1000. The F1000 model operates on the premise of the popularity. The more votes an article gets, the more staying power the article has.

But should popularity be linked to significance and/or quality? Investigations into the incongruity between popularity and influence suggests that these should be decoupled [13]. Or put another way: is it the percentage of accepted manuscripts that makes a quality journal, or is it that all articles meet certain benchmarks? And if the acceptance criterion is the only acceptable measure of quality, then is it an unfortunate one that stifles innovation [14].

Here's the deal: you give me $1,000, and I'll give you legitimacy, or you pay me a subscription fee, and I'll give you even more legitimacy....... COURTESY: South Park, Scott Tenorman Must Die.

So are there legitimate issues of concern here? Of course there are. But there are also pressing problems with the status quo that are for some reason not as shocking. Fooling people with non-sequiturs and supposedly self-evident experimental design flaws is a clever rhetorical device. But it does not answer some of the most pressing issues in balancing academic quality control with getting things out there (e.g. reporting results and scientific interaction) [15]. In the spirit of non-sequiturs, I leave you with a video clips from Patton Oswalt's TED talk highlighting the lack of quality control in the motivational speaking industry.

Still image from the Patton Oswalt TED talk, which parodied motivational speaking by generating nonsensical passages using the generalized motivational schema (e.g. sentence styles, jargon).

NOTES: 

[1] For more, please see: Black, D.  Everything Liberal Activists Do Is Wrong and Destructive. Eschaton blog, July 30 (2010) AND Krugman, P.  VSP Economics. The Conscience of a Liberal blog, May 7 (2011).

[2] Bohannon, J.   Who’s Afraid of Peer Review? Science, 342, 60-65 (2013). The reason I make this judgmental statement is because it is important to distinguish between legitimate skepticism and fostering a moral panic (e.g. open-access is bad for science, and I'm going to use the organ of a major journal to foster support of the cause). I feel that Bohannon has crossed this line.

For a more nuanced take on the phenomenon of predatory open-access journals, please see: Beall, J. "Predatory" Open-access Scholarly Publishing. The Charleston Advisor, April (2010).

[3] the modeling of non-sequiturs that resemble a particular field's jargon (e.g. legalese, postmodernism) using a recursive transition algorithm. For more on the Dada Engine, please see: Bulhak, A.  On the Simulation of Postmodernism and Mental Debility Using Recursive Transition Networks. CiteSeerX repository (1996).

[4] I have a confession: I was rejected from PLoS One! However, this might not be as "bad" as it sounds, if these two references are correct:

a) Neylon, C.   In defence of author-pays business models. Science in the Open blog, April 29 (2010).

b) Anderson, K.   PLoS’ Squandered Opportunity — Their Problems with the Path of Least Resistance. The Scholarly Kitchen blog, April 27 (2010).

[5] Hawks, J.   "Open access spam" and how journals sell scientific reputation. John Hawks weblog, October 3 (2013).

Of course, conventional journals also rely on the same sense of reputability, whether deserved or not. For more please see: Reich, E.S.   Science publishing: the golden club. Nature News, October 16 (2013).

[6] Eisen, M.   I confess, I wrote the Arsenic DNA paper to expose flaws in peer-review at subscription- based journals. It is NOT Junk blog, October 3 (2013).

Since the Bohannon article deals with a competing publication model, Science should have at least issued a conflict-of-interest disclaimer upon publication. As the Wikipedia cleanup editors would say: this article sounds like an advertisement.

[9] Basken, P.   Critics Say Sting on Open-Access Journals Misses Larger Point. Chronicle of Higher Education, October 4 (2013).

[10] Ivanoransky   The Anil Potti retraction record so far. Retraction Watch blog, February 14 (2012).

* or simply Google the names "Yoshitaka Fujii" and "Joachim Boldt" -- their retraction count is astounding.

More insight might be found in the following paper: Steen, R.G., Casadevall, A. and Fang, F.C.   Why has the number of scientific retractions increased? PLoS One, 8(7), e68397.

[11] For a visionary take (written in 1998 and using National Lab pre-print servers as a template for the future) on open-access publishing, please see: Harnad, S.   The invisible hand of peer review. Nature Web Matters, November 5 (1998).

* this reference also discusses self-policing vs. peer consensus and the issue of peer review as a popularity poll.

[12] Hawks, J.   Time to trash anonymous peer review? John Hawks weblog, October 3 (2013).

[13] Solis, B.   The Difference between Popularity and Influence Online. PaidContent, March 24 (2012).

[14] I was once told that to be accepted for publication, a scientific article should not have too many novelties in it. For example, an article that has a novel theoretical position or method is okay, but not both (or additional novelties). This was anecdotal -- however, this seems to be a built-in conservative bias of the peer-review system.

UPDATE (11/5)! What is the optimal level of novelty relative to scientific impact? For a large-scale analysis, please see: Uzzi, B., Mukherjee, S., Stringer, M., and Jones, B.   Atypical Combinations and Scientific Impact. Science, 342, 468-472 (2013).

[15] Food for thought: does peer-review and standards actually harm science by excluding negative results from the literature? For more about this and the replicability crisis in science, please see this article (which I will be coming back to in a future post): Unreliable research: trouble at the lab. Economist, October 19 (2013).

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