Showing posts with label essays-science-and-engineering. Show all posts
Showing posts with label essays-science-and-engineering. Show all posts

February 20, 2026

10^6 All Time Pageviews: why all the attention?

"If I had a mutant strain for every misattributed quote on the internet, I'd have over a million mutant strains" -- Salvator Luria

Since the above quote is obviously misattributed, a trend that will no doubt get worse before it gets better [1], it's worth reflecting on how pageviews get counted and the workings of the attention economy.

As of February 10, Synthetic Daisies blog has 1,000,000 page views. One million! Ten to the sixth power! After 17 years, 1 month, and 16 days of posting, then not posting, and finally doing a lot of cross-posting, all while specializing in nothing. All the while not (as far as I know) having been mentioned in the Epstein files [2]. In fact, being skeptical of tech hype and dismayed by scientific racism. And with a nearly unbroken streak of Darwin Day posts since 2009, and many posts on science communication and open access. In terms of volume, this blog peaked in the 2012-2014 period and have declined since, as did a lot of science-oriented blogging enterprises.

In the past 2 years or so, there has been a great uptick in pageviews [3]. I am not sure why, although word on the light cycle trail is that most internet traffic is the product of automation. Nevertheless, a million pageviews of content is something of a milestone. Not least of which is that I can continue my pageview milestone/solar system metaphor. So here it is, "Synthetic Daisies blog" (a.k.a. Voyager 1) leaving the solar system.

As for the attention economy, it does seem that things with deep academic content do not get the numbers of views or followers that shallower content or (especially) conspiracy theories do [4]. In my mind, this is baked in: for YouTube content, this can be demonstrated. So much for monetization! Although revisiting an early post on the arcanocracy might address some of this.  

References:

[1] Garry et.al (2024). Large language models (LLMs) and the institutionalization of misinformation. Trends in Cognitive Science, 28(12), 1078-1088.

[2] a) apparently, this blog is officially run by a "loser", b) we really need to revisit the relationship between Epstein, John Brockman, Adam Bly, and the popular science of late 2000s vintage. I was a big fan of Seed Magazine and Edge.org, which were apparently edgy in more ways than one.  

[3] The 500,000 pageviews milestone was reached in December of 2022.

[4] While a lot of this is platform-dependent, some of this is affinity scam dependent. See Joe Rogan and his relationship with Spotify.

April 10, 2020

fQXi essay on the Undecidable, Uncomputable, and Unpredictable


It's that time of year again: the fQXi essay contest for 2020 is going strong! Every 12-24 months, fQXi (Foundational Questions Institute) sponsors an essay content on a different topic. The fQXi community [1] then responds to the essay using a ratings and comment system. This year's topic was "Undecidability, Uncomputability, and Unpredictability", a topic not only applicable to physics, but to fields ranging from Computer Science to Sociology and even Biology. Check out the collection of submissions for some incredibly creative takes on the topic.


Myself, along with Orthogonal Research and Education Lab members Jesse Parent (@JesParent on Twitter) and Ankit Gupta (@ankiitgupta7 on Twitter) submitted an essay called "The illusion of structure or insufficiency of approach? the un(3) of unruly problems".

I have also posted several essays from years past as part of a ResearchGate project. These include "Establishing the Phenomenological Conditions of Intention-like Goal-oriented Behavior" from 2016 and "Towards the meta-fundamental: introducing intercontextual invariants" from 2018.

A few weeks after submitting this year's essay, I discovered the work of Nicolas Gisin, who has published a series of papers [2] on alternative forms of mathematics (such as intuitionism) for describing complex systems. While his examples are limited to physics, they are a complement to this year's essay.

NOTES:
[1] for some stimulating internet discussion, check out the Alternative Models of Reality section of the fQXi community.

[2] Gisin, N. (2020). Mathematical languages shape our understanding of time in physics. Nature Physics, 16, 114–116.

April 30, 2016

Claude Shannon, posthumously 1100100

How do you model a centennial birthday, Dr. Shannon? COURTESY: Hackaday blog.

Claude Shannon, the so-called father of information theory, was born 100 years ago today [1]. This is a Google Doodle-worthy event, even though he died in 2001. Hence, internet rule #34' [2]: "if there exists a milestone, there's a Google Doodle for it".

April 30, 2016 Google Doodle.

Claude was also a juggler and an inventor of mechanical toys, hence the zeros and ones being juggled in the Doodle. A few years ago I wrote a post detailing this "mechanical zoo". Not a real zoo, mind you, but a collection of mechanical wonders far removed from his information theory work [3].


NOTES:
Spectrum, April 27.

[2] I made up Rule #34' as a less-provocative variant of existing Rule #34.

[3] his Master's thesis and Bell Systems Technical Journal paper (pdf) were milestones in the then- emerging academic field.

August 26, 2015

Scientific Bytes and Pieces, August 2015

Welcome to this month's version of Scientific Bytes and Pieces. The first feature is a sad note: complexity theorist John Holland has passed away at the age of 86. The father of genetic algorithms and a pioneer in the field of complex adaptive systems, Holland's contributions will live on. Here are two obituaries: one from the New York Times and another from the Washington Post (written by Holand's colleague Scott Page).

R,I,P. John Holland. COURTESY: Plexus Institute.

The SAVE/Point collaboration and Stefano Meschiari have developed an interactive game called Super Planet Crash. This "hours-of-fun"-type game simulates the gravitational dynamics of solar systems. Build your own solar system today! The virtual world physics come courtesy of algorithms designed to detect exoplanets.

Screenshot of Super Planet Crash. WARNING: it is not as easy as it looks.

Next up is a recent article from FiveThirtyEight Blog called "Science Isn't Broken". Despite the sizable body of blog posts and articles lamenting the "brokenness" of the modern scientific enterprise, it turns out that such fears are misplaced. As it turns out, science is a hard enterprise, and prone to error, unexpectedness, and revision. Since I believe that couching these realities as symptoms of dysfunction does the scientific community more harm than good, this discussion is a welcome contribution to our understanding of how science is done.

Interestingly, whenever the topic of "broken science" comes up, cognitive biases are almost never mentioned. Yet cognitive biases play an integral role in decision-making and interpretation. Even algorithms have been shown to exhibit significant social biasJim Davies offers us an article via Nautil.us called "Why You’re Biased About Being Biased" in which he reviews the state of cognitive bias research. An accessible tour of the field as well as food for thought (and reevaluation of those thoughts).

Another reason why science is hard rather than broken is the existance of chaotic behavior. Strange and unpredictable phenomena such as transient chaos challenge the expectations and arguments of the "science is broken" crowd. Some people, such as Tamas Tel, find joy in these types of phenomena. See the recent Chaos article "The Joy of Transient Chaos" for this perspective. While not particularly accessible to a popular science audience, the article should give you a glimpse into an alternate perspective.

An artistic take on a series of hyperlinked documents. COURTESY: boingboing.net.

Despite the hard nature of the scientific enterprise, every once in a while breakthroughs are made. This year is a milstone for several of these. The word "hypertext" is 50 years old, and the Einstein's publication on General Relativity is 100 years old. On a related note, Einstein's "Annus Mirabilis" was 110 years ago this year. So much for broken science.

Following-up on a previous Synthetic Daisies post about Theory Hackathons, here is an article that makes the case for hackers to support the cause of scientific data analysis. While the focus is on taming the glut of Neuroscience data, the same principle would apply to all large-scale data. Can hackers help to make sense of data and can they help us bridge the gulf between data and theory? Perhaps we will discuss this in a future post.

October 6, 2014

The Map of the Cat, the Hair of the Dog, and Other Metaphors and Descriptors


What's in a set of descriptions, or a set of metaphors for that matter? Quite a bit or very little, depending on whether or not you are working in your area of specialty. Richard Feynman once (and to the great consternation of neurophysiologists within earshot) referred to a feline brain atlas as the “map of the cat” (not to be confused with Arnold’s Cat Map).

Recurrent cats! But what about its brain?

This parable, of course, speaks to the role of jargon in science. I am generally in support of jargon-filled science, providing it serves to conceptually unify and serve as shorthand for complex phenomena. The problem occurs when it serves as a membership proxy into the high priesthood of Discipline x or Disipline y (ironically for Feynman, one of these disciplines was and is theoretical physics).



Far from making one sound like a drunken PoMo generator, jargon and highly-specialized language is sometimes an efficient information encoding scheme. But sometimes shortcuts that transcend jargon (but only briefly) are quite useful as well. But words are not enough. Sometimes it takes not a paradigm shift but a conceptual shift. And sometimes that takes a semi-humorous (and non-specialized) turn of phrase. Perhaps even a pun or two (to wit):

Q: what do an airplane crash investigators and experimental scientists have in common?

A: both look for an answer inside of a black box!

May 12, 2014

Fireside Science: The Analysis of Analyses

This material is cross-posted to Fireside Science. This is part of a continuing series on the science of science (or meta-science, if you prefer). The last post was about the structure and theory of theories.


In this post, I will discuss the role of data analysis and interpretation. Why do we need data, as opposed to simply observing the world or making up stories? The simple answer: it gives us a systematic accounting of the world in general and experimental manipulations in particular. As opposed to the apparition on a piece of toast, it provides a systematic accounting of the natural world independent of our sensory and conceptual biases. But as we saw in the theory of theories post, and as we will see in this post, it takes a lot of hard work and thoughtfulness. What we end up with is an analysis of analyses.

Data take many forms, so approach analysis with caution. COURTESY: [1].

Introduction
What exactly is data, anyways? We hear a lot about it, but rarely stop to consider why it is so potentially powerful. Data are both an abstraction of and incomplete sampling (approximation) of the real world. While the data are not absolute (e.g. you can always have more data or more completely sample the world), the data provide a means of generalization that is partially free from stereotyping. And as we can see in the cartoon above, not all data that influence our hypothesis can even be measured. Some of it is beyond the scope of our current focus and technology (e.g hidden variables), while some of it consists of interactions between variables.

In the context of the theory of theories, data has the same advantage over anecdote that deep, informed theories have over naive theories. In the context of the analysis of analyses, data does not speak for itself. To conduct a successful analysis of analysis, it is important to be both interpretive and objective. Finding the optimal balance between each of these gives us an opportunity to reason more clearly and completely. If this causes some people to lose their view of data as infallible, then so be it. Sometimes the data fails us, and other times we fail ourselves.

When it comes to interpreting data, the social psychologist Jon Haidt suggests that "we think we are scientists, but we are actually laywers" [2]. But I would argue this is where the difference between the untrained eyes sharing Infographics and the truly informed acts of analysis and data interpretation becomes important. The latter is an example of a meta-meta-analysis, or a true analysis of analyses.

The implications of Infographics are clear (or are they?) COURTESY: Heatmap, xkcd.

NHST: the incomplete analysis?
I will begin our discussion with a current hot topic in the field of analysis. It involves interpreting statistical "significance" using an approach called Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (or NHST). If you have even done a t-test or ANOVA, you have used this approach. The current discussion about the scientific replication crisis is tied to the use (and perhaps overuse) of these types of tests. The basic criticism involves the inability of NHST statistics to conduct multiple tests properly and properly deal with experimental replication.

Example of the NHST and its implications. COURTESY: UC Davis StatWiki.

This has even led scientists such as John Ioannidis to demonstrate why "most significant results are wrong". But perhaps this is just to make a rhetorical point. The truth is, our data are inherently noisy. Too many assumptions/biases go into collecting most datasets, all for data which has too little known structure. Not only are our data noisy, but in some cases may also possess hidden structure which violates the core assumptions of many statistical tests [3]. Some people have rashly (and boldly) proposed that this points to flaws in the entire scientific enterprise. But, like most things, this does not take into account the nature of the empirical enterprise and reification of the word significance.

A bimodal (e.g. non-normal) distribution, being admonished by its unimodal brethren. Just one case in which the NHST might fail us.

The main problem with the NHST is that it relies upon distinguishing signal from noise [4], but not always in the broader context of effects size or statistical power. In a Nature News correspondence [5], Regina Nuzzo discusses the shortcomings of the NHST approach and tests of statistical significance (e.g. p-values). Historical context of the so-called frequentist approach [6] is provided, and its connection to assessing the validity of experimental replications are discussed. One possible solution is the use of Bayesian techniques [7] to assess something called statistical power. The Bayesian approach allows one to use a prior distribution (or historical conditioning) to better assess the meaningfulness of one's statistically significant result. But the construction of priors relies on the existence of reliable data. If these data do not exist for some reason, we are back to square one.

Big Data and its Discontents
Another challenge to conventional analysis involves the rise of so-called big data. Big data is the collection and analysis of very large datasets, which come from sources such as high-throughput biology experiments, computational social science, open-data repositories, and sensor networks. Considering their size, big data analyses should allow for good power and ability to distinguish signal from noise. Yet due to their structure, we are often required to rely upon correlative analyses. While correlation is equated with relational information, it (as it always has) does not equate to causation [8]. Innovations in machine learning and other data modeling techniques can sometimes overcome this limitation, but correlative analyses are still the easiest way to deal with these data.

IBM's Watson: powered by large databases and correlative inference. Sometimes this cognitive heuristic works well, sometimes not so much.

Given a large enough collection of variables with a large number of observations, correlations can lead to accurate generalizations about the world [9]. The large number of variables are needed to extract relationships, while the large number of observations are needed to understand the true variance. This can be a problem where subtle, higher-order relationships (e.g. feedbacks, time-dependent saturations) exist or when the variance is not uniform with respect to the mean (e.g. bimodal distributions).

Complex Analyses
Sometimes large datasets require more complicated methods to find relevant and interesting features. These features can be thought of as solutions. How do we use complex analysis to find these features? In the world of analysis of analyses, large datasets can be mapped to solution spaces with a defined shape. This strategy uses convergence/triangulation as a guiding principle, but does so through the rules of metric geometry and computational complexity. A related and emerging approach called topological data analysis [10] can be used to conduct rigorous relational analyses. Topological data analysis takes datasets and maps them to a geometric shape (e.g. topology) such as a tree or in this case a surface.


A portrait of convexity (quadratic function). A gently sloping dataset, a gently sloping hypothesis space. And nothing could be further from the truth......

In topological data analyses, the solution space encloses all possible answers on a surface, while the surface itself has a shape that represents how easy it is to move from one portion of the solution space to another.
One common assumption is that this solution space is known and finite, while the shape is convex (e.g. a gentle curve). If that were always true, then analysis would be easy: we could use a moderate large-sized dataset to get the gist of patterns in the data. any additional scientific inquiry would constitute filling in the gaps. And indeed sometimes it works out this way.

One example of a topological data analysis of most likely Basketball positions (includes both existing and possible positions). COURTESY: Ayasdi Analytics and [10].

The Big Data Backlash.....Enter Meta-Analysis
Despite its successes, there is nevertheless a big data backlash. Ernest Davis and Gary Marcus [11] present us with nine reasons why big data are problematic. Some of these have been covered in the last section, while others suggest that there can be too much data. This is an interesting position, since it is common wisdom that more data always give you more resolution and insight. Insight and information can be obscured by noisy or irrelevant data. But even the most informative of datasets can yield misinformed analyses if the analyst is not thoughtful.

Of course, ever-bigger datasets by themselves do not give us the insights necessary to determine whether or not a generalized relationship is significant. The ultimate goal of data analysis should be to gain deep insights into whatever the data represent. While this does involve a degree of interpretive subjectivity, it also requires an intimate dialogue between analysis, theory, and simulation. Perhaps the latter is much more important, particularly in cases where the data are politically or socially sensitive. These considerations are missing from much contemporary big data analysis [12]. This vision goes beyond the conventional "statistical test on a single experiment" kind of experimental investigation, and leads us to meta-analysis.

The basic premise of a meta-analysis is to use a strategy of convergence/triangulation to converge upon results using a series of studies. The logic here involves using the power of consensus and statistical power to arrive at a solution. The problem is represented as a series of experiments with an effect size for each. For example, if I believe that eating oranges causes cancer, how should I arrive at a sound conclusion? One study with a very large effect size, or many studies with various effect sizes and experimental contexts. According to the meta-analysis view, the latter should be most informative. In the case of potential factors in myocardial infarction [13], significant results that all point in the same direction (with minimum effect size variability) lend the strongest support to a given hypothesis.

Example of a meta-analysis. COURTESY: [13].

The Problem with Deep Analysis
We can go even further down the rabbit hole of analysis, for better or for worse. However, this often leads to problems of interpretation, as deep analyses are essentially layered abstractions. In other words, they are higher-level abstractions dependent upon lower-level abstractions. This leads us to a representation of representations, which will be covered in an upcoming post. Here, I will propose and briefly explore two phenomena: significant pattern extraction and significant reconstructive mimesis.

One form of deep analysis involves significant pattern extraction. While the academic field of pattern recognition has made great strides [14], sometimes the collection of data (which involve pre-processing and personal bias) is flawed. Other times, it is the subjective interpretation of these data which are flawed. In either case, this results in the extraction patterns that make no sense that are then assigned significance. Worse yet, some of these patterns are also thought to be of great symbolic significance [15]. The Bible Code is one example of such pseudo-analysis. Patterns (in this case secret codes) are extracted from a database (a book), and then these data are probed for novel but coincidental pattern formation (codes formed by the first letter of every line of text). As this is usually interpreted as decryption (or deconvolution) of an intentionally placed message, significant pattern extraction is related to the deep, naive theories discussed in "Structure and Theory of Theories".

Congratulations! Your pattern recognition algorithm came up with a match. Although if it were a computer instead of a mind, it might do a more systematic job of rejecting it as a false positive. LESSON: the confirmatory criteria for a significant result needs to be rigorous.

But suppose that our conclusions are not guided by unconscious personal biases or ignorance. We might intentionally leverage biases in the service of parsimony (or making things simpler). Sometimes, the shortcuts we take in representing natural processes present difficulties in understanding what is really going on. This is a problem of significant reconstructive mimesis. In the case of molecular animations, this has been pointed out by Carl Zimmer [16] and PZ Myers [17] for molecular animations. In most molecular animations, processes occur smoothly (without error) and within full view of the human observer. Contrast this with the inherent noisiness and spatially-crowded environment of the cell, which is highly realistic but not very understandable. In such cases, we construct a model which consists of data, but that model is selective and the data is deliberately sparse (in this case smoothed). This is an example of a representation (the model) that informs an additional representation (the data). For purposes of simplicity, the model and data are somehow compressed to preserve signal and remove noise. And in the case of a digital image file (e.g. .jpg, .gif) such schemes work pretty well. But in other cases, the data are not well-known, and significant distortions are actually intentional. This is where big challenges arise in getting things right.

An multi-layered abstraction from a highly-complex multivariate dataset? Perhaps. COURTESY: Salvador Dali, Three Sphinxes of Bikini.

Conclusions
Data analysis is hard. But in the world of everyday science, we often forget how complex and difficult this endeavor is. Modern software packages have made the basic and well-established analysis techniques deceptively simple to employ. In moving to big data and multivariate datasets, however, we begin to face head-on the challenges of analysis. In some cases, highly effective techniques have simply not been developed yet. This will require creativity and empirical investigation, things we do not often associate with statistical analysis. It will also require a role for theory, and perhaps even the theory of theories.

As we can see from our last few examples, advanced data analysis can require conceptual modeling (or representations). And sometimes, we need to map between domains (from models to other, higher-order models) to make sense of a dataset. This, the most complex of analyses, can be considered representations of representations. Whether a particular representation of a representation is useful or not depends upon how much noiseless information can be extracted from the available data. Particularly robust high-level models can take very little data and provide us with a very reliable result. But this is an ideal situation, and often even the best models presented with large amounts of data can fail to given a reasonable answer. Representations of a representations also provide us with the opportunity to imbue an analysis with deep meaning. In a subsequent post, I will this out in more detail. For now, I leave you with this quote:
“An unsophisticated forecaster uses statistics as a drunken man uses lampposts — for support rather than for illumination.” Andrew Lang.

NOTES:
[1] Learn Statistics with Comic Books. CTRL Lab Notebook, April 14 (2011).

[2] Mooney, C.   The Science of Why We Don't Believe Science. Mother Jones, May/June (2011).

[3] Kosko, B.   Statistical Independence: What Scientific Idea Is Ready For Retirement. Edge Annual Question (2014).

[4] In order to separate signal from noise, we must first define noise. Noise is consistent with processes that occur at random, such as the null hypothesis or a coin flip. Using this framework, a significant result (or signal) is a result that deviates from random chance to some degree. For example, a p-value of 0.05 represents a 95% chance that the replicates observed could not have occurred due to chance. This is, of course, an incomplete account of the relationship between signal and noise. Models such as Signal Detection Theory (SDT) or data smoothing techniques can also be used to improve the signal-to-noise ratio.

[5] Nuzzo, R.   Scientific Method: Statistical Errors. Nature News and Comment, February 12 (2014).

[6] Fox, J.   Frequentist vs. Bayesian Statistics: resources to help you choose. Oikos blog, October 11 (2011).

[7] Gelman, A.   So-called Bayesian hypothesis testing is just as bad as regular hypothesis testing. Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science blog, April 2 (2011).

[8] For some concrete (and satirical) examples of how correlation does not equal causation, please see Tyler Vigen's Spurious Correlations blog.

[9] Voytek, B.   Big Data: what's it good for? Oscillatory Thoughts blog, January 30 (2014).

[10] Beckham, J.   Analytics Reveal 13 New Basketball Positions. Wired, April 30 (2012).

[11] Davis, E. and Marcus, G.   Eight (No, Nine!) Problems with Big Data. NYTimes Opinion, April 6 (2014).

[12] Leek, J.   Why big data is in trouble - they forgot applied statistics. Simply Statistics blog, May 7 (2014).

[13] Egger, M.   Bias in meta-analysis detected by a simple, graphical test. BMJ, 315 (1997).

[14] Jain, A.K., Duin, R.P.W., and Mao, J.   Statistical Pattern Recognition: a review. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 22(1), 4-36 (2000).

It is interesting to note that the practice of statistical pattern recognition (training a statistical model with data to evaluate additional instances of data) has developed techniques and theories related to rigorously rejecting false positives and other spurious results.

[15] McCardle, G.     Pareidolia, or Why is Jesus on my Toast? Skeptoid blog, June 6 (2011).

[16] Zimmer, C.     Watch Proteins Do the Jitterbug. NYTimes, April 10 (2014).

[17] Myers, P.Z.   Molecular Machines! Pharyngula blog, September 3 (2006).

November 19, 2013

Fireside Science: The Inefficiency (and Information Content) of Scientific Discovery

This content has been cross-posted to Fireside Science.


In this post, I will discuss somewhat of a trendy topic that needs further critical discussion. It combines a crisis in replicating experiments with the recognition that science is not an perfect or errorless pursuit. We start with a rather provocative article in the Economist called "Trouble at the Lab" [1]. The main idea: the practice of science needs serious reform in its practice, from standardization of experimental replicability to greater statistical rigor. 


While there are indeed perpetual challenges posed by the successful replication of experiments and finding the right statistical analysis for a given experimental design, most of the points in this article should be taken with a grain of salt. In fact, the conclusions seem to suggest that science should be run more like a business (GOAL: most efficient allocation of resources). This article suffers from many of the same issues as the Science article featured in my last Fireside Science post. Far from being an efficient process, the process of making scientific discoveries and discovering the secrets of nature require a very different set of ideals [2]. But don't just rely on my opinions. Here is a sampling of letters to the editor which followed:


The first is from Stuart Firestein, the author of "Ignorance: how it drives science", which is discussed in [2]. He argues that applying a statistician's theoretical standards to all forms of data is not realistic. While the portion of the original article [1] discussing problems with statistical analysis in most scientific papers is the strongest point made, it also rests on some controversial assumptions. 

The first involves a debate as to whether or not the Null Hypothesis Significance Test (NHST) is the best way to uncover significant relationships between variables. NHST is the use of t-tests and ANOVAs to determine significant differences between experimental conditions (e.g. treatment vs. no treatment). As an alternative, naive and other Bayesian methods have been proposed [3]. However, this still makes a number of assumptions about the scientific enterprise and process of experimentation to which we will return.


The second letter is refers to one's philosophy of science orientation. This gets a bit at the issue of scientific practice, and how the process of doing science may be misunderstood by a general audience. Interestingly, the notion of "trust, but verify" does not come from science at all, but from diplomacy/politics. Why this is assumed to also be the standard of science is odd.


The third letter will serve as a lead-in to the rest of this post. This letter suggests that the scientific method is simply not up to the task of dealing with highly complex systems and issues. The problem is one of public expectation, which I agree with in part. As experimental methods provide a way to rigorously examine hypothetical relationships between two variables, uncertainty may often swamp out that signal. While I think this aspect of the critique is a bit too pessimistic, let's keep these thoughts in mind.......

A reductionist tool in a complex world

Now let's turn to what an experiment uncovers with respect to the complex system you want to understand. While experiments have great potential for control, they are essentially hyper-reductionist in scope. When you consider that most experiments test the potential effect of one variable on another, an experiment may serve no less of a heuristic function than a simple mathematical model [4]. And yet in the popular mind, empiricism (e.g. data) tends to trump conjecture (e.g. theory) [5].

Figure 1. A hypothesis of the relationship between a single experiment and a search space (e.g. nature) that contains some phenomenon of interest.

Ideally, the goal of a single experiment is to reliably uncover some phenomenon in what is usually a very large discovery space. As we can see in Figure 1, a single experiment must be designed to overlap with the phenomenon. This can be very difficult to accomplish when the problem at hand is complex and multi-dimensional (HINT: most problems are). A single experiment is also a relatively information-poor way to conduct this investigation, as shown in Figure 2. Besides being a highly-controllable (or perhaps highly reduced complex) means to test hypotheses, an alternate way to think about experimental design is as an n-bit register [6].

Figure 2. A single experiment may be an elegant way to uncover the secrets of nature, but how much information does it actually contain?

Now to get an idea of how such overlap works in the context of replication, we can turn to the concept of an experimental footprint (Figure 3). Experimental footprints qualitatively describes what an experiment (or it's replication) uncovers relative to some phenomenon of interest. Let's take animal behavior as an example. There are many sources of variation that contribute to a specific behavior. In any one experiment, we can only observe some of the behavior, and even less of the underlying contributing factors and causes. 

A footprint is also useful in terms of describing two things we often do not think about. One is the presence of hidden variables in the data. Another is the effect of uncertainty. Both depend on the variables tested and problems chosen. But just because subatomic particles yield fewer surprises than human psychology does not necessarily mean that the Psychologist is less capable than the Physicist.

Figure 3. Experimental footprint of an original experiment and it's replication relative to a natural phenomenon.

The original maternal imprinting experiments conducted among geese by Konrad Lorenz serve as a good example. The original experiments were supposedly far messier [7] than the account presented in modern textbooks. What if we suddenly were to find out that replication of the original experimental template did not work in other animal species (or even among ducks anymore)? It suggests that we may need a new way to assess this (other than chalking it up to mere sloppiness).


So while lack of replication is a problem, the notion of a crisis is overblown. As we have seen in the last example, the notion of replicable results is an idealistic one. Perhaps instead of saying that the goal of experimental science is replication, we should consider a great experiment as one that reveals truths about nature. 

This may be best achieved not by the presence of homogeneity, but also a high degree of tolerance (or robustness) to changes in factors such as ecological validity. To assess the robustness of a given experiment and its replications (or variations), we can use information content to tell us whether or not a given set of non-replicable experiments actually yield information. This might be a happy medium between an anecdotal finding and a highly-repeatable experiment.


Figure 4. Is the goal of an experiment unfailingly successful replication, or a robust design that provides diverse information (e.g. successful replications, failures, and unexpected results) across replications?

Consider the case of an experimental paradigm that yields various types of results, such as the priming example from [1]. While priming is highly replicable under certain conditions (e.g. McGurk effect) [8], there is a complexity that requires taking the experimental footprint and systematic variation between experimental replications into account. 

This complexity can also be referred to as the error-tolerance of a given experiment. Generally speaking, the error tolerance of a given set of experiments is correspondingly higher as information content (related to variability) increases. So just because the replications do not pan out, they are nonetheless still informative. To maximize error-tolerance, the goal of an experiment should be an experiment with a small enough footprint to be predictive, but a large enough footprint to be informative. 

In this way, experimental replication would no longer be the ultimate goal. Instead, the goal would be to achieve a sort of meta-consistency. Meta-consistency could be assessed by both the robustness and statistical power of an experimental replication. And we would be able to sleep a little better at night knowing that the line between hyper-reductionism and fraudulent science has been softened while not sacrificing the rigors of the scientific method.

NOTES:

[1] Unreliable Research: trouble at the lab. Economist, October 19 (2013).

[2] Alicea, B.   Triangulating Scientific “Truths”: an ignorant perspective. Synthetic Daisies blog, December 5 (2012).

[3] Johnson, V.E.   Revised standards for statistical evidence. PNAS, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1313476110

[4] For more information, please see: Kaznatcheev, A.   Are all models wrong? Theory, Games, and Evolution Group blog, November 6 (2013).

[5] Note that the popular conception of what a theory is and what theories actually are (in scientific practice) constitutes two separate spheres of reality. Perhaps this is part of the reason for all the consternation.

[6] An n-bit register is a concept from computer science. In computer science, a register is a place to hold information during processing. In this case, processing is analogous to exploring the search space of nature. Experimental designs are thus representations of nature that enable this register.

For a more formal definition of a register, please see: Rouse, M.   What is a register? WhatIs.com (2005).

[7] This is a personal communication, as I cannot remember the original source. The larger point here, however, is that groundbreaking science is often a trial-and-error affair. For an example (and its critique), please see: Lehrer, J.   Trials and Errors: why science is failing us. Wired, December 16 (2011).

[8] For more on the complexity of psychological priming, please see: Van den Bussche, E., Van den Noortgate, W., and Reynvoet, B.   Mechanisms of masked priming: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 135(3), 452-477 (2009).

August 20, 2013

Fear and Loathing in Robotistan

Do you fear your (future) robot overlords? In a recent Mashable op-ed [1], John Havens argued that we should fear the future of artificial intelligence, if only for it's propensity to get things wrong and our propensity to put too much trust in the machine's output. Another emerging theme in popular culture, from fear of the coming singularity [2] to fear of the deleterious impact robots will have on job growth [3], is something I will call robo-utopianism and robo-angst, respectively.

Ken Jennings. One man who welcomes our new robotic overlords.

Is robo-angst a general fear of the unknown? Or is it a justified response to an emerging threat? I would argue that it is mostly the former. In a previous Synthetic Daisies post critiquing futurism, I postulated that predicting the future involves both unbridled optimism and potential catastrophe. While some of this uncertainty can be overcome by considering the historical contingencies involved, the mere existence of unknowns (particularly if they involve intangibles) drive angsty and utopian impulses alike.

Both of these impulses are also based on the nature of modern robotic technology. Perhaps due to our desire to cheaply replicate a docile labor force, robots represent intelligent behavior that is ultra-logical, but not particularly human [4]. Perhaps the other aspects of human intelligence are hard to reproduce, or perhaps there is indeed something else at work here. Nevertheless, this constraint can be seen and nature of tests for sentience such as the Captcha (Turing test-like pattern recognition in context) to distinguish humans from spambots.

Examples of Captcha technology. COURTESY: captcha.net

So how do we go about achieving sentience? As robo-utopians would have it, this is the next logical step in artificial intelligence research, requiring only natural increases in the current technology platform given time. Does becoming sentient involve massive increases in the ultra-logical paradigm, massive increases in embedded context, or the development of an artificial theory of mind? And if making robots more human requires something else, do we even need to mimic human intelligence?

Perhaps part of the answer is that robots (physical and virtual) need to understand humans well enough to understand their questions. A recent piece by Gary Marcus in the New Yorker [5] posits that modern search and "knowledge" engines (e.g. Wolfram|Alpha) can do no better than chance (e.g. robo-stupidity) for truly deep, multilayered questions that involve contextual knowledge. 

When robots do things well, it usually involves the aspects of human cognition and performance that we understand fairly well, such as logical analysis and pattern recognition. Much of the current techniques in machine learning and data mining are derived from topics that have been studied for decades. But what about the activities humans engage in that are not logical? 

Example of the biological absurdity test.

One example of adding to the ultra-logical framework comes from social robotics and the simulation of emotional intelligence [6]. But animals exhibit individual cognition, social cognition, and something else which cannot be replicated simply by adding parallel processing, emotional reflexivity, or "good enough" heuristics. What's more, the "logical/systematic" and "irrational/creative" aspects of human behavior are not independent. For better or worse, the right-brained, left-brained dichotomy is a myth. For robots to be feared (or not to be feared), they must be like us (e.g. assimilated).

Examples of machine absurdity. TOP: an absurd conclusion from a collection of facts, BOTTOM: deep irony and unexpected results, courtesy of a recommender system.

Perhaps shared cultural patterns among a group of robots, or "cultural" behaviors that are nonsense from a purely logical perspective and/or traditional evolutionary perspective. Examples include: the use of rhetoric and folklore to convey information, the subjective classification of the environment, and conceptual and axiomatic blends [7]. 

How do you incorporate new information into an old framework? For humans, it may or may not be easy. If it falls within the prevailing conceptual framework, it is something humans AND robots can do fairly well. However, when the idea (or exemplar in the case of artificial intelligence) falls outside the prevailing conceptual framework, we face what I call the oddball cultural behavior problem

Take ideas that lie outside the sphere of the prevailing conceptual model (e.g. spherical earth vs. flat earth, infection vs. pre-germ theory medicine) as an example. These ideas could be viewed as revolutionary findings, ideas at odds with the status quo, or as crackpot musings [8]. The chosen point-of-view is informed either by naive theory (e.g. conceptual and axiomatic blends) or pure logical deduction. Regardless of which is used, when the number of empirical observations in a given area is largely unknown, the less tied to formal models the arguments become, and wild stories may predominate. This may explain why artificial intelligence sometimes makes nonsensical predictions, or why humans sometimes embrace seemingly nonsensical ideas.

Incorporating new information into an old framework, a.k.a. the oddball cultural behavior problem. When the idea falls well outside of the existing framework, how is it acted upon?

In some cases, oddball cultural behavior is classified using conceptual blends (or short-cuts) [9] are used to integrate information. This is similar but distinct from how heuristics are used in decision-making. In this case, cultural change (or change in larger context/structures) is regulated (implemented in a combinatorial manner) by these short-cuts. One might use a short-cut (more flexible than changing a finite number of rules) to respond to the immediate needs of the environment, but because it is not an exact response, the cultural system overshoots the optimal response, thus requiring additional short-cuts.

Moving on from what robots don't do well, some of the robo-angst is directed towards the integration of people and machines (or computation). The discussion in Haven's op-ed about Steve Mann might be understood as radically-transparent ubiquitous computing [10]. Steve Mann's experience is intriguing for the same reasons that human culture is a selectively-transparent ubiquitous framework for human cognition and survival. The real breakthroughs in autonomous intelligence in the future might only be made by incorporating radically-transparent ubiquitous computing into the design of such agents.

When tasks require intersubjective context, it is worth asking the question: which is funnier to the professional clown? A robotic comedian? Perhaps, but he's not quite skilled in the art. COURTESY: New Scientist and Dilbert comic strip.

Why would we want a robot that makes rhetorical slogans [11]? Or a robot that uses ritual to relate with other robots? Or a denialist [12] bot? Before the concurrent rise of big data, social media, and machine learning, the answer might be: we don't. After all, a major advantage of robots is to create autonomous agents that do not exhibit human foibles. Why would we want to screw that up?

However, it is worth considering that these same expert systems have uncovered a lot of aggregate human behavior that both violate our intuition [13] and are not something to be proud of. These behaviors (such as purchasing patterns or dishonesty) may not be optimal, yet they are the product of intelligent behavior all the same [14]. If we want to understand what it means to be human, then we must build robots that engage in this side of the equation. Then perhaps we may see the confluence of robo-angst and robo-utopia on the other side of the uncanny valley.

NOTES: 

[1] Havens, J.   You should be afraid of Artificial Intelligence. Mashable news aggregator, August 3 (2013).

[2] Barrat, J.   Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era. Thomas Dune Books (2013).

[3] Drum, K.   Welcome, robot overlords. Please don't fire us? Mother Jones Magazine, May/June (2013) AND Coppola, F.   The Wastefulness of Automation. Pieria magazine, July 13 (2013).

For a fun take on this, see: Morgan R.   The (Robot) Creative Class. New York Magazine, June 9 (2013).

[4] Galef, J.   The Straw Vulcan: Hollywood's illogical appraoch to logical decisionmaking. Measure of Doubt Blog, November 26 (2011).

[5] Marcus, G.   Why can't my computer understand me? New Yorker Magazine, August 16 (2013).

For a take on recommender systems and other intelligent agents gone bad (e.g. the annoying valley hypothesis), please see: Moyer, B.   The Annoying Valley. EE Journal, November 17 (2011).

[6] Dautenhahn, K., Bond, A.H., Canamero, L., Edmonds, B.   Socially Intelligent Agents. Kluwer (2002).

[7] Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M.   The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending And The Mind's Hidden Complexities. Basic Books (2013) AND Sweetser, E.   Blended spaces and performativity. Cognitive Linguistics, 11(3-4), 305-334 (2000).

[8] For an example of oddball and potentially crackpot ideas in science, please see: Wertheim, M.   Physics on the Fringe: Smoke Rings, Circlons, and Alternative Theories of Everything. Walker & Company (2011) AND Horgan, J.   In Physics, telling cranks from experts ain't easy. Cross-Check blog, December 11 (2011).


[9] Edgerton, R.B.   Rules, Exceptions, and Social Order University of California Press, Berkeley (1985).

[10] For an interesting take on Steve Mann's approach to Augmented Reality and its social implications, please see: Alicea, B.   Steve Mann, misunderstood. Synthetic Daisies blog, July 18 (2012).

[11] Denton, R.E.   The rhetorical functions of slogans: Classifications and characteristics. Communication Quarterly, 28(2), 10-18 (1980).


[13] For an accessible review, please see the following feature and book: 

Lohr, S.   Sizing up Big Data, Broadening Beyond the Internet. Big Data 2013 feature, New York Times Bits blog, June 19 (2013).

Mayer-Schonberger, V. and Cukier, K.   Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think. Houghton-Mifflin (2013).

[14] Similar types of behaviors (e.g. the Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis) can be seen in non-human animal species. For classic examples from monkeys, please see: Byrne, R.W. and Whiten, A.   Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Oxford University Press (1989). 

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